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Article 11 ECHR and the Right to Collective Bargaining: 
Pharmacists’ Defence Association Union v Boots Management Services Ltd 
[2017] EWCA Civ 66 
 
Alan Bogg* and Ruth Dukes** 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Writing in this Journal seventeen years ago, Keith Ewing drew readers’ attention to a somewhat 
complex set of rules contained in the then new statutory recognition procedure.1 Taken together, 
these appeared to constitute a breach of international law. The issue arose in respect of a rule 
intended to prevent an independent trade union from utilising the procedure in situations where 
the employer already recognised a different union for the purposes of collective bargaining. The 
problem identified by Ewing was that this rule applied even where the recognised union was not 
independent of the employer, and even where the recognition agreement did not cover the core 
issues of pay, hours and holidays. This stood in contrast to the general thrust of the Schedule, 
which excluded non-independent unions from eligibility to apply for recognition under its terms. 
As a consequence of these rules, Ewing suggested, employers had been provided with an incentive 
to recognise non-independent unions voluntarily as a means of preventing an unwelcome 
application by an independent union. This amounted to a breach of Article 2, ILO Convention 98, 
Ewing argued, and its requirement that trade unions be protected by the state against employer 
‘interference’.        
 
In the recent case of Pharmacists’ Defence Association Union (‘PDAU’) v Boots Management 
Services Ltd (‘Boots’), the employer, Boots, took advantage of the relevant rules of the statutory 
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recognition procedure in precisely the manner foreseen by Ewing. Knowing that the PDAU wished 
to be recognised by it, Boots entered into a recognition agreement with a non-independent trade 
union, the Boots Pharmacists Association (‘BPA’), rendering the PDAU’s subsequent application 
under the recognition procedure inadmissible. Before the Court of Appeal, it was argued on behalf 
of PDAU that the recognition procedure failed, for that reason, to comply with Article 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’, ‘the Convention’); and that the PDAU was 
consequently entitled to a declaration of incompatibility pursuant to section 4 of the Human Rights 
Act 1998. The Court of Appeal did not accept the argument. In reaching its decision, the Court 
focused on the fact that the obstacle placed in the PDAU’s path to recognition was not ‘absolute’. 
It remained possible for an application to be made under the statutory procedure by a worker in 
the bargaining unit to have the BPA derecognised. If that application was supported by a sufficient 
number of workers under a statutory derecognition ballot, subject to the elevated majoritarian 
threshold requiring forty percent of the bargaining unit to vote in favour of derecognition, the 
PDAU’s application for recognition under TULRCA 1992 Schedule A1 could then be 
reconsidered under the relevant statutory admissibility and validity criteria.  
 
In what follows, we take issue with the Court of Appeal’s decision on two sets of grounds. These 
relate, first, to the Court’s interpretation of Article 11 and the right to collective bargaining 
protected by it (part 4) and, secondly, to the significance that the Court ascribes in its decision-
making to the margin of appreciation (part 5). We begin in part 2 by explaining the facts and law 
pertinent to the case and, in part 3, the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. Our argument, which is 
developed throughout the course of the commentary, is that the Court’s decision in Boots is of 
wider ranging significance than might first be apprehended. It is not only relevant to the matter of 
the interpretation of Article 11 ECHR, and the right to collective bargaining protected by it, 
important though that may be. The decision also raises issues of fundamental constitutional 
significance: the margin of appreciation, the separation of powers and the exclusion of sections of 
our society from participation in the institutions of democracy.        
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2. THE PATH TO THE COURT OF APPEAL  
 
A. The Facts 
 
The facts of the case illustrate well the potential for the statutory recognition procedure to be 
manipulated by an employer seeking to block an unwanted application from an independent trade 
union. Having ‘substantial membership’ among pharmacists employed by Boots, the PDAU first 
made a formal request to Boots to be recognised in January 2012. When the request was refused, 
it applied to the CAC the following month to be recognised under the terms of the procedure. At 
that point, Boots indicated a willingness to talk. Acting, presumably, in reliance on that indication, 
the PDAU withdrew its application. Instead of entering into talks with the PDAU, however, Boots 
almost immediately concluded a recognition agreement instead with the BPA, undertaking therein 
to bargain collectively with the union regarding ‘facilities for its officials and the machinery for 
consultation in respect of the matters upon which we will consult [and not] on any other matters’. 
In October 2012, the PDAU made a second application to the CAC to be recognised by Boots 
under the terms of the recognition procedure. Following a hearing in December 2012, the CAC 
reached the conclusion that this application was admissible. On an ordinary reading of the relevant 
part of the procedure, the PDAU’s application was inadmissible by reason of Boots’ prior 
recognition of the BPA. In the opinion of the CAC, however, such a reading would entail a breach 
of the rights of the PDAU and its members as protected by Article 11 ECHR. To avoid this breach, 
the CAC instead ‘read down’ the relevant paragraph (para 35) in accordance with section 3 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, concluding that the BPA recognition agreement did not render the 
PDAU’s application inadmissible because it did not cover the core matters of pay, hours and 
holidays. Following an application by Boots for judicial review of the CAC’s decision, Keith J 
ruled in January 2014 that the inadmissibility of the PDAU’s application gave rise to a breach of 
Article 11, as the CAC had said, but that it was not possible, even construing the relevant paragraph 
in accordance with section 3 of the 1998 Act, to give it the meaning that the CAC had done. 
Accordingly, Keith J allowed Boots’ claim and quashed the CAC’s decision. The PDAU then 
responded with an application to the High Court for a declaration of incompatibility under section 
4 of the 1998 Act. The Secretary of State was accordingly joined as an intervener. In July 2014, 
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that claim was dismissed by Sir Brian Keith (by then retired) on the basis that there was in fact no 
breach of Article 11: the obstacle posed to recognition of the PDAU by the prior recognition of 
the BPA was not absolute, but could be removed by the derecognition of the BPA under the 
provisions of the procedure. 
 
The facts of the Boots case were thus similar to those encountered some years before in the 
infamous NUJ decision, where the employer accorded voluntary recognition to a competing 
independent trade union, the British Association of Journalists, which had ‘at most’ a single 
member in the relevant bargaining unit.2 In that case, however, it was not even open to the NUJ 
to seek statutory derecognition of its competitor union, clearing the way for it then to apply for 
statutory recognition itself. Applications for derecognition of an independent trade union are not 
admissible, under the procedure, if that union was recognised voluntarily by the employer. Even 
though the NUJ had a significantly greater number of members within the bargaining unit than the 
British Association of Journalists, then, the recognition agreement with the latter remained in 
force, preventing an application for statutory recognition from the former for as long as it continued 
to do so.  
 
 
B. The Law 
 
At the heart of the decisions of the CAC and Sir Brian (in both his guises) lay their respective 
interpretations of the statutory recognition procedure contained in Schedule A1 of the Trade Union 
and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (‘TULRCA’). The procedure was introduced in 
1999, came into force in 2000, and was amended in 2004. Very broadly, it involves an application 
to the CAC by an independent trade union that has been refused voluntary recognition by the 
employer, consideration of that application by the CAC and, ultimately, the possibility of a 
declaration by the CAC that the union is ‘recognised as entitled to conduct collective bargaining’. 
‘Recognition’ under the procedure, is recognition for the purposes of collective bargaining only, 
and collective bargaining is defined, for the purposes of the Schedule, as bargaining over pay, 
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hours and holidays only (paras 1, 3). Admissible applications can be made only by independent 
trade unions, and only in respect of employers which (together with associated employers) employ 
at least 21 workers (paras 6,7). As we have already seen, applications cannot be made in connection 
with workers in respect of whom the employer already recognizes a trade union, even if that union 
is not independent (para 35). For the purposes of this last rule, the relevant definition of collective 
bargaining is not the one mentioned above, but the more general definition contained in section 
178 of the 1992 Act (para 3(6)), according to which, ‘collective bargaining’ means negotiations 
relating to or connected with one or more of a list of specified ‘matters’. (It may now be clear to 
the reader why Boots specified in its agreement with the BPA collective bargaining regarding 
‘facilities for officials’ and ‘machinery for consultation’, since these are two of the matters referred 
to in section 178.)  
 
Applications for derecognition of a trade union under the Schedule proceed in a similar manner to 
applications for recognition.3 To win a ballot in favour of de-recognition, a majority of the relevant 
workers must vote in favour, and the majority must include at least 40% of the bargaining unit. 
One difference, with particular importance in circumstances such as those arising in this case, is 
that only a worker or workers within the bargaining unit can apply to have a union derecognised: 
a would-be applicant union has no right to apply (part VI). And while the recognised (non-
independent) union has a statutory right of access to the workers to be balloted (in addition to the 
employer’s freedom of access), neither the applicant nor any other interested independent union 
has a similar right of access. In short, the procedure is weighted heavily against a successful 
application for derecognition. 
 
The argument that the recognition procedure breaches not only international law, as Ewing argued 
in 2000, but also the European Convention on Human Rights, rests on the more recent 
interpretation of Article 11 by the Strasbourg Court in cases such as Wilson v UK (‘Wilson’) and 
Demir and Baykara v Turkey (‘Demir’).4 In Wilson, it was held that Article 11 required that a 
trade union and its members be free, in one way or another, to seek to persuade an employer to 
listen to the representations that it made; moreover, that it was the role of the state to ensure that 
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union members were not prevented or restrained from using their union to represent them in 
attempts to regulate their relations with the employer. In Demir, it was famously held that the right 
to collective bargaining was an essential element of Article 11. Taking these two rulings together, 
could it be concluded that Article 11 places positive obligations on a state to ensure the effective 
right to collective bargaining, or the trade union’s right that it should be heard on behalf of its 
members? If it could, then what was the precise nature of those obligations, and of those rights? 
  
 
3. THE REASONING OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
As articulated in the lead judgement of Underhill LJ, the matter that fell to be determined by the 
Court of Appeal was this: whether, in rendering inadmissible an otherwise valid application by an 
independent trade union to be recognised to negotiate about pay, hours and holidays, by reason of 
the employer’s recognition of a non-independent trade union in respect of other, entirely marginal, 
matters, paragraph 35 of the recognition procedure gave rise to a breach of the independent trade 
union’s rights under Article 11 ECHR.  
 
Proceeding to consider the extent of the rights accorded to an independent trade union by Article 
11, the Lord Justice recognised, referring to Demir and Wilson, that the right to collective 
bargaining was protected as an essential element of freedom of association, and, moreover, that 
the state might be under a positive obligation to secure enjoyment of that right. In judging the 
nature and extent of the state’s positive obligation, the Court referred only to Strasbourg 
authorities, including especially the recent case of Unite the Union v UK (‘Unite v UK’; ‘Unite’).5 
The invitation extended to the Court by Mr Hendy, acting for the PDAU, to be guided by a 2015 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was declined on the grounds that that decision was not 
directly authoritative (para 48). On the basis, then, of the Court’s rather minimalist reading of the 
Strasbourg case law, it judged that while Article 11 did guarantee a right to collective bargaining, 
it did not confer a ‘universal right on any trade union to be recognised in all circumstances’. To 
the extent that the rules of any recognition scheme constrained access to collective bargaining for 
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a particular union (or its members), the constraints would have to be justified by relevant and 
sufficient reasons, and should strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. In 
assessing any such justification, however, the state should be accorded a wide margin of 
appreciation (para 54). 
 
Turning then to consider the matter of whether the recognition procedure gave rise to a breach of 
Article 11 so interpreted, the Court found itself persuaded by the argument put forward on behalf 
of Boots and the Secretary of State, and adopted by Sir Brian in the High Court. It remained 
possible, so that argument went, for an application to be made under Part IV of the procedure to 
have the BPA derecognised; if that application was successful, an application for recognition made 
by the PDAU would then be admissible; for these reasons, the constraint imposed upon the PDAU 
by virtue of the prior recognition of BPA and the rule contained in paragraph 35 was not absolute, 
and there was no breach of Article 11. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal dismissed 
two objections raised by Mr Hendy for the PDAU. The first of these was that the rules allowing 
for an application for derecognition did not apply in this case. Their application was reliant on the 
BPA being ‘recognised as entitled to conduct collective bargaining’ under paragraph 134(1). 
Collective bargaining was not defined here, except that paragraph 136 stated that the definition 
contained in section 178 TULRCA did not apply. In the absence of that definition, so Mr Hendy 
argued, the fact that Boots had agreed to negotiate with the BPA about ‘facilities for its officials 
and the machinery for consultation arrangements’ could not sensibly lead to the conclusion that it 
was ‘recognised as entitled to conduct collective bargaining on behalf of a group or groups of 
workers’. It followed that no application for derecognition could be made; consequently, that the 
constraint placed on the PDAU was absolute.6  
 
The second objection raised by Mr Hendy related to the requirement in the procedure that an 
application for derecognition be made by a worker or workers and not by the PDAU itself. The 
protections provided for in Part VIII of Schedule A1 for workers who were subjected to a 
                                                          
6 Of course, in the NUJ scenario outlined above, there is no possibility of an application for derecognition: see fn 2 
above and associated text. It would seem to follow that the protected position of recognised independent trade 
unions that are not representative of the bargaining unit must now be regarded as a clear violation of a 
representative trade union’s right to collective bargaining as protected by Article 11. This would be so even on the 
Court of Appeal’s minimalist approach to Article 11 in Boots. 
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detriment, including dismissal, for exercising their rights under the Schedule, might not be 
sufficient to instil confidence in a worker that she would not suffer any disadvantage by reason of 
making an application for derecognition. There is nothing to prevent an employer from engaging 
in the kind of behaviour displayed in Carrington v Therm-A-Stor,7 provided that its retaliatory 
action was found to be attributable to the union’s actions as distinct from those of the individual 
employees. It is significant, here, too, that the ‘unfair practice’ provisions contained in paragraphs 
119A to 119H of the recognition procedure apply only after a statutory ballot has been ordered by 
the CAC. Finally, a worker otherwise minded to make an application for derecognition might in 
any case be reticent to appear disloyal to the BPA, or to colleagues who were active in it. The 
Article 11 rights of the PDAU could only be protected, Mr Hendy argued, by a mechanism that 
allowed it to apply in its own right for the derecognition of the BPA. 
 
The Court did not accept the interpretation of Part IV advanced by Mr Hendy, that the BPA could 
not be regarded, as was required under the terms of paragraph 134(1), as ‘recognised as entitled to 
conduct collective bargaining’. Such an interpretation, the Court said, would be plainly contrary 
to the policy of Schedule A1 in general, and the purpose of Part VI in particular to provide an 
escape route for workers covered by a recognition arrangement with a non-independent trade 
union. Nor did the Court regard it as fatal to the Respondents’ argument that only a worker, and 
not the PDAU, could apply for derecognition of the BPA. Instead, it approved Sir Brian Keith’s 
assessment (paras 67, 65), that:  
[i]t is very unlikely that the PDAU will be unable to find a single pharmacist within Boots 
who wants the PDAU to be recognised for the purposes of collective bargaining in place 
of the BPA, and who is willing to put their head above the parapet. And if the PDAU is not 
able to find such a pharmacist, that is overwhelmingly likely to have been because there is 
insufficient support for the PDAU among Boots' pharmacists for any application for 
statutory recognition to be successful. 
 
This assertion was proffered by the Court of Appeal without any reference to empirical literature 
on the operation of the recognition procedure. In any case, its conclusion that Article 11 had not 
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been breached appears to have rested, above all, on its understanding that a wide margin of 
appreciation ought to be applied: 
The devising of a statutory scheme of recognition inevitably requires a large number of 
detailed choices about both substantive and procedural matters… There will inevitably be 
some choices which not only could have been made differently but could have been made 
better. But I think it is clear from the case-law of the ECtHR referred to above that article 
11 cannot be used as a tool to challenge this or that arguably sub-optimal element in a 
scheme provided that a fair balance has been struck. Both before and after Demir the Court 
has emphasised the wide margin of appreciation which must be accorded to member states 
in this area (para 68).     
 
 
4. THE RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING  
 
It has been mentioned above that in seeking to interpret Article 11 – and to understand both the 
nature of the ‘right to collective bargaining’ protected, and the nature and extent of the positive 
obligations placed upon a state to secure that right – Underhill LJ relied solely on the case law of 
the Strasbourg Court, and especially the recent case of Unite v UK. In considering the facts before 
him, he then introduced an additional framework of interpretation, namely, the Hohfeldian notion 
of rights and correlative duties.8 To the Lord Justice, the relevance of this framework to Article 
11 was clear: ‘I cannot understand in what sense the union could be said to have a right to negotiate 
with the employer unless the employer were under an obligation to negotiate with it’ (para 54). It 
did not follow, however, as we have seen, that he regarded Article 11 as conferring ‘a universal 
right on any trade union to be recognised in all circumstances’. Why not? Because the ‘competing 
interests at stake’ might well justify limitations or ‘constraints’ on access to collective bargaining. 
In assessing whether any limitation or constraint was justified, moreover, the state should be 
accorded a wide margin of appreciation. In configuring the statutory recognition procedure to 
preclude an application from a trade union in circumstances where the employer already 
                                                          
8 WN Hohfeld and WW Cook. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. Vol. 115. (Praeger 
Pub Text 1964). 
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recognised a non-independent trade union, the UK government had acted, so the Lord Justice ruled, 
within that margin of appreciation. 
     
A number of criticisms may be brought to bear on this reading of Article 11 and the right to 
collective bargaining. We find it regrettable, in the first instance, that the Lord Justice should have 
followed the ruling in the Unite case as closely as he did. As an admissibility decision, rather than 
a full judgment on the merits, the decision is not binding on the Strasbourg Court itself and does 
not carry the authority of Wilson or Demir. For Underhill LJ, it was more directly on point than 
either of the earlier cases, however, since it involved, like Boots, a complaint ‘based on the denial 
of a right to compel an employer to engage in collective bargaining’ – in this case, by way of the 
abolition, in 2013, of the Agricultural Wages Board (‘AWB’) (para 47). The principal message to 
be gleaned from Unite was that such complaints could be distinguished from Demir, on the basis 
that the latter had involved direct state interference with an existing collective agreement. In the 
words of the Strasbourg Court, cases involving, instead, the ‘denial of a right to compel … 
collective bargaining’ were ‘far removed’ from Demir.9 As such, Underhill LJ concluded, they 
might ‘face an uphill struggle’ (para 47).      
 
In our opinion, the Unite decision is poorly reasoned, and based upon a dubious understanding of 
the domestic legal framework.10 While it is true that the annulment of a voluntary concluded 
collective agreement, such as occurred in Demir, constitutes a very deep intrusion into the right to 
collective bargaining, the situation of the agricultural workers in Unite was such that the abolition 
of the established mechanism for collective bargaining, the AWB, was likely, in the absence of a 
successor mechanism, to render their right to collective bargaining nugatory. Given that in 
agriculture the vast majority of employers fail to meet the stipulated threshold of employing at 
least 21 workers, the statutory recognition procedure was of no practical use to them. In addition, 
the dispersed and often precarious nature of employment in the sector rendered it highly unlikely 
that groups of co-workers would be able to wield the threat of industrial action effectively, so as 
to force ‘voluntary’ recognition agreements upon employers. To characterise the abolition of the 
AWB as ‘far removed’ from the facts of Demir therefore lacks the sensitivity shown in Wilson to 
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10 K Arabadijeva in the ILJ, forthcoming 
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the real position of the workers vis-à-vis their employer. Moreover, it appears to be underpinned 
by a narrow conception of the substance of the right to collective bargaining: if only an extreme 
measure such as the annulment of the collective agreement, or something very close, strikes at the 
very substance of the right, then there is not very much to it. 
 
In Boots, the Court of Appeal’s characterisation of the PDAU’s complaint as ‘based on the denial 
of a right to compel an employer to engage in collective bargaining’ (para 47) was reinforced by 
its adoption of a Hohfeldian framework that rights must, as a logical necessity, correspond to 
correlative duties. The ‘real question’ before the Court, according to Underhill LJ, was whether 
Article 11 conferred a right to bargain collectively with the employer ‘and its correlative 
obligation’ (para 53, our emphasis). In rendering the PDAU’s application for recognition 
inadmissible, the recognition procedure might have been seen to deny the union a ‘right to compel 
… collective bargaining’, but for the possibility of derecognition of the BPA. In our opinion, the 
Lord Justice’s focus upon the existence of a putative obligation on the part of the employer to 
bargain collectively with the union is a misleading distraction. As Bogg and Ewing have argued, 
the Hohfeldian notion of rights and duties is unhelpful in the context of collective bargaining for 
the very reason that it leads to a preoccupation with jural relations between private parties, 
diverting attention from the crucial role that positive duties on governments play in securing the 
effective realization of human rights. 11  The better point of focus for a court tasked with 
interpreting the right to collective bargaining is not the employer’s duty to recognise or to bargain, 
but rather the state’s duty to ensure that collective bargaining is effectively promoted through a 
range of supportive techniques. This interpretation has the benefit of mirroring the existing 
requirements of international law and, especially, ILO Convention 98. It also fits neatly with the 
so-called ‘voluntarist’ tradition of the UK, according to which there was no legal duty on 
employers to recognise trade unions but, instead, a right to strike and – until 1980 – in some 
circumstances, the possibility of ‘compulsory’ arbitration, or the erga omnes extension of 
collectively agreed terms and conditions.12 On this interpretation, furthermore, what the ‘right to 
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collective bargaining’ entails is, indeed, not a ‘universal right on any trade union to be recognised 
in all circumstances’ but – arguably – a right for any independent trade union to be afforded the 
opportunity and appropriate positive legal support to persuade/apply pressure on an otherwise 
reluctant employer to recognise it. This is what the right to strike affords trade unions, and what 
the statutory recognition procedure aims to afford them in some circumstances. This is what Unite 
was denied when the AWB was abolished. 
 
The Court of Appeal’s preoccupation with Hohfeld is also incompatible with the important 
principle of effectiveness developed by the Strasbourg Court: that ‘the aim of the Convention is to 
guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective’.13 
From this perspective, what matters is the substance of the protection and not its juridical form. 
The concept of a ‘duty to bargain’ is, of course, a central feature of the North American model of 
enterprise-level collective bargaining. It is not a feature of many European systems, in which 
collective bargaining is promoted in a wide variety of ways: through administrative support of 
sectoral bargaining; through the use of public contracting powers to promote the observance of 
representative collective agreements; or through legal machinery to guarantee the erga omnes 
effect of collectively agreed norms in an industry. The shocking failings of some ‘Hohfieldian’ 
schemes based upon a correlative ‘duty to bargain’, notably in the US, are well-documented. With 
a view to effectiveness, it would make little sense to elevate the ‘duty to bargain’ as an essential 
element of Article 11, especially in systems based upon sectoral bargaining arrangements. It would 
also seem absurd to consecrate a Hohfeldian reading of Article 11’s right to collective bargaining 
in a European context where the very idea of a ‘duty to bargain’ is utterly alien to labour law 
traditions in many European countries. In these circumstances, it is a great pity that the Court of 
Appeal was so reluctant to engage in any comparative perspective on the legal problems before it. 
 
With respect then, it is our opinion that the Court of Appeal erred in relying so closely upon the 
decision in Unite and ought, instead, to have looked to the more authoritative cases of Wilson and 
Demir. Following Wilson, the Court might have chosen to focus not on the right to collective 
bargaining and its correlative duties, but rather, on the trade union’s fundamental right to be heard. 
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In the Wilson case, as may be recalled, the protection of individual trade unionists’ rights was not 
regarded as sufficient to protect the rights of the trade union itself.14 According to the Court of 
Appeal in Boots, however, it did not follow from that ruling ‘that a scheme for compulsory 
recognition should place all the levers in the hands of a union for which recognition is sought 
rather than in the hands of those who wish to be represented by it’ (para 66). While we might agree 
with the terms of the Court’s statement, we would also agree with Mr Hendy’s argument that the 
proper lesson to be drawn from Wilson is that the PDAU ought to have been able to apply itself 
for derecognition of the BPA (para 64). This would be an aspect of its right to be heard. After all, 
even if an applicant trade union were to enjoy such a right (to apply for derecognition of a non-
independent trade union), the ‘levers’ would, in substance, remain in the hands of constituent 
workers. Those workers would still be required to support derecognition and then to support 
recognition of the applicant trade union in a separate process, subject to the Schedule’s stringent 
majority support thresholds. In our view, then, it would have been possible for the Court of Appeal 
to find that the core right infringed in Boots was the PDAU’s fundamental ‘right to be heard’ by 
the employer under Article 11. The failure to provide the PDAU with a statutory right to trigger 
the derecognition procedure against the BPA, forcing it to rely on workers taking that step on their 
behalf, was a violation of the trade union’s independent right to be heard. 
 
Following the ruling in Demir, it would also have been possible for the Court of Appeal to find 
that Article 11 had been breached by reason of the UK’s failure to ensure that the PDAU enjoyed 
a ‘practical and effective’ right to collective bargaining.15 It may be recalled that Underhill LJ was 
invited by Mr Hendy to consider the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in 
Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada,16 but declined to do so on the basis that he ‘did 
not find it helpful’.17 This was because ‘to the extent that the statements of principle there accord 
with those of the ECtHR they add nothing. To the extent that they differ, we must plainly take our 
                                                          
14 When the UK Government responded to the Wilson judgment by creating new rights for individual workers, but 
not trade unions, it was subjected to criticism by the Joint Committee on Human Rights (Thirteenth Report of 
Session 2003-04, 2.18-9) – see A Bogg, ‘Employment Relations Act 2004: Another False Dawn for Collectivism?’ 
(2005) 34 Ind Law J 72-82. 
15 Artico v Italy 
16 [2015] 1 SCR 1. 
17 Para 48 
14 
 
lead from Strasbourg in interpreting the scope of article 11.’18 On their face, these propositions 
are of course impeccable. It is a matter of some regret, however, that his Lordship declined to 
consider the Canadian jurisprudence. This is because the SCC in Mounted Police Association of 
Ontario was specifically concerned with the constitutional propriety of a statutory arrangement 
that imposed a labour relations regime on members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police through 
a non-independent staff association, the Staff Relations Representative Program, while excluding 
collective bargaining arrangements with independent associations formed voluntarily by the 
workers themselves. These statutory arrangements were scrutinised under the Canadian Charter’s 
protection of freedom of association under s 2 (d). While Underhill LJ is of course correct that the 
Court of Appeal must take its lead from Strasbourg, not Ottawa, the convergence of labour rights 
under the ECHR and the Canadian Charter justifies treating the Canadian jurisprudence as relevant 
to the interpretive task under Article 11. The justification for doing so here is particular strong, 
given the overlapping concerns in Boots and Mounted Police Association of Ontario; and, by 
contrast, the fact that the ECtHR has yet to address substantive matters that are even remotely 
proximate to the factual context in Boots. 
 
According to a majority of the SCC, the imposition of this specific labour relations model 
constituted a ‘substantial interference’ with the employees’ freedom of association. This 
conclusion flowed from the SCC’s affirmation of ‘a purposive and generous’ interpretation of 
freedom of association in section 2 (d) of the Charter. 19  The application of this interpretive 
approach identified a constitutionally protected ‘right of employees to meaningfully associate in 
the pursuit of collective workplace goals’.20 This encompassed the ‘right to a meaningful process 
of collective bargaining’ as a ‘necessary element’ of the right to ‘meaningfully associate in the 
pursuit of collective workplace goals.’21 The SCC then provided a normative elaboration of the 
constituents of a ‘meaningful process of collective bargaining’ in terms of ‘choice’ and 
‘independence’.22 ‘Choice’ is concerned with enabling ‘employees to have effective input into the 
selection of the collective goals to be advanced by their association’, which would be guaranteed 
                                                          
18 Ibid 
19 Para 47 
20 Para 67 
21 Para 71 
22 Para 81 
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by ‘the ability to form and join new associations, to change representatives, to set and change 
collective workplace goals, and to dissolve existing associations’.23 These mechanisms contribute 
to the ‘accountability’ of bargaining representatives to the workers they purport to represent.24 
‘Independence’ is concerned to ensure that ‘the activities of the association are aligned with the 
interests of its members’.25 It will be comprised of matters such as ‘the freedom to amend the 
association’s constitution and rules, the freedom to elect the association’s representatives, control 
over financial administration and control over the activities the association chooses to pursue.’26 
Taken together, this provided a constitutional metric for evaluating the Charter compliance of 
labour relations arrangements ‘based on the degrees of independence and choice guaranteed by the 
labour relations scheme, considered with careful attention to the entire context of the scheme.’27 
In turn, the extent to which the scheme implemented a right to meaningful collective bargaining 
was determined by the degree of choice and independence. On this basis, a majority of the SCC 
concluded that the imposed labour relations model in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
organisation was a ‘substantial interference’ with s 2 (d) freedom of association.  
 
In our view, construing Demir through the lens of Mounted Police Association of Ontario identifies 
four issues of particular significance in the Boots litigation. First, the requirement of ‘meaningful 
collective bargaining’ was plainly not satisfied in the blocking arrangements negotiated with the 
BPA. The ‘Boots and the BPA in Partnership’ agreement was entered into almost immediately 
after Boots had persuaded the PDAU to withdraw its statutory application, and it was ‘concerned 
with purely consultative arrangements’ except for collective bargaining rights in respect of 
facilities for officials and machinery for consultation.28 These recognition arrangements seemed 
to be a nugatory shell of collective bargaining, nominal in substance albeit legally effective in 
blocking the PDAU’s competing statutory application under Schedule A1. In no sense could the 
collective bargaining arrangement with the BPA be characterised as ‘meaningful’, and it is difficult 
to understand why Demir would countenance ‘non-meaningful’ collective bargaining under the 
                                                          
23 Para 86 
24 Para 87 
25 Para 83 
26 Para 89 
27 Para 90 
28 Para 21 
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Article 11 standard. Second, the default statutory priority accorded to non-independent 
associations undermines the ‘accountability’ that is an essential precondition of ‘meaningful’ 
collective bargaining. While the origins of the BPA are such that it was not a staff association set 
up by the employer,29 the Certification Officer nevertheless concluded that the BPA was ‘liable to 
interference’ by Boots.30 It had never organised industrial action against Boots, existing in a 
relationship described as ‘cosy’, and enjoyed financial and material support from Boots.31 Third, 
the requirement of ‘choice’, specifically the ‘right to change representatives’, is arguably 
compromised by the cumbersome derecognition mechanism under Schedule A1 and its failure to 
accord a legal right to trigger the legal derecognition procedure to a representative and independent 
trade union seeking recognition on behalf of the workforce.  
 
Finally, the SCC emphasised the constitutional division of responsibility between the courts and 
the legislator. The constitutional task of the court was to assess the constitutional compliance of 
legislation, albeit that ‘a variety of labour relations models may provide sufficient employee choice 
and independence.’ 32  This allowed a degree of creative latitude to legislators in the 
implementation of labour relations regimes that were constitutionally compliant, hence ‘the search 
is not for an “ideal” model of collective bargaining, but rather for a model which provides 
sufficient employee choice and independence to permit the formulation and pursuit of employee 
interests in the particular workplace context at issue.’33 Moreover, s 2 (d) did not require ‘a process 
whereby every association will ultimately gain the recognition it seeks.’ 34  There is thus no 
question of the constitutional standard in Mounted Police Association of Ontario 
‘constitutionalising’ a conflictual ‘Wagner Act’ model of collective labour relations, or of judges 
engaging in a constitutional usurpation of the legislative job of drafting labour relations statutes.35 
These perceptive insights into the constitutional limits of judicial review in the sensitive area of 
                                                          
29 Decision of the Certification Officer of 20th May 2013 ‘An application by the Boots Pharmacists Association (BPA) 
under section 6 (1) of the TULRCA 1992 to be listed as an independent trade union’, para 47. 
30 Ibid Para 50. 
31 Ibid Para 49 
32 Para 92 
33 Para 97 
34 Para 98 
35 Brian Langille, 'Why Are Canadian Judges Drafting Labour Codes—And Constitutionalizing The Wagner Model?' 
(2009–2010) 15 CLELJ 101. 
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collective labour relations may well have fortified the English Court of Appeal in Boots given its 
own latent anxieties about trespassing on Parliament’s role – on which, see Part 5 below. 
 
In our opinion, the Court of Appeal could have benefited greatly by giving its consideration to 
these core operative principles identified by the SCC as pertinent to interpretation of s 2 (d) of the 
Charter: ‘meaningful collective bargaining’, ‘choice’, and ‘independence’. Of course, we are not 
suggesting that the SCC reasoning provides mechanical answers to the legal questions in Boots. 
Assessing ‘choice’ and ‘independence’ invites controversial assessments of fact and degree. 
Furthermore, there are obviously important differences between the constitutionally impugned 
arrangements in Mounted Police Association of Ontario and those being challenged in Boots. For 
example, the SSRP was described by the SCC as ‘an organization they did not choose and do not 
control. They must work within a structure that lacks independence from management.’36 By 
contrast, the Certification Officer’s report on the BPA suggests that its independence had been 
compromised to a lesser degree. Furthermore, worker ‘choice’ was utterly negated in Mounted 
Police Association of Ontario given that the labour relations arrangements were imposed through 
law, with collective bargaining through independent trade unions excluded. By contrast, the 
‘choice’ in Boots was impeded by cumbersome legal procedures for derecognition that were 
insufficiently protective of individual workers. ‘Choice’ was not, however, wholly extinguished. 
 
Nevertheless, the general interpretive approach in Mounted Police Association of Ontario has 
much to commend it. The SCC emphasised that the assessment of constitutional compliance of 
labour relations regimes should be undertaken contextually, examining the operation of the labour 
relations regime holistically and not taking single factors (such as ‘choice’ or ‘independence’) in 
isolation. From this contextual perspective, the Court of Appeal’s rather blinkered fixation on 
‘choice’ as a cure to any potential Article 11 breach seems difficult to justify. The legislative 
arrangements were suspect in Boots because of the cumulative interaction between ‘choice’, 
‘independence’ and ‘meaningful collective bargaining’. The default statutory priority accorded to 
nominal (meaningless?) recognition arrangements with a non-independent trade union, coupled 
with deficient legislative arrangements for protecting the workers’ choice to designate an 
                                                          
36 Para 106 
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alternative bargaining representative that was independent and representative, seem to us to present 
a clear example of an Article 11 violation. The surprising judicial decision to foreclose that 
contextual enquiry, disregarding comparative material that was directly relevant to the 
interpretation of freedom of association standards under Article 11, allowed for a troubling lack of 
focus on the relevant issues in Boots. 
 
 
5. JUDICIAL POWER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The constitutional subtext to Boots represents a conservative conception of the judicial role in 
human rights litigation. There are two dimensions to judicial power in human rights adjudication 
under the Human Rights Act: (i) the relationship between the domestic courts and the ECtHR, and 
whether domestic human rights jurisprudence should ‘mirror’ the jurisprudence of the ECtHR; (ii) 
the constitutional division of responsibilities between the courts and Parliament in the protection 
of human rights.  
 
Consideration of the first entails interpretation of HRA 1998 s 2 (1) (a) and its requirement that 
the court ‘must take into account any…judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the 
European Court of Human Rights’. It is uncontroversial that the ECHR should be regarded as 
setting a minimum ‘floor’ to domestic human rights protections. As binding obligations under 
international law, it is incumbent on domestic courts to develop the law so as to ensure respect for 
those obligations.37 It is an altogether more controversial proposition that European human rights 
law imposes a ‘ceiling’ of human rights protection on national courts. The ‘floor’ approach would 
obviously confer greater creative latitude on domestic courts in developing a more protective 
domestic human rights law that is sensitive to national values. In Boots, the Court of Appeal 
seemed to adopt a ‘ceiling’ approach to Article 11, confining itself to the strictest and most limited 
reading of the right to freedom of association as reflected in the Unite admissibility decision.  
                                                          
37 For discussion, see Eirik Bjorge, ‘Common Law Rights: Balancing Domestic and International Exigencies’ (2016) 
75 CLJ 220. For a recent example in labour law, where the Supreme Court developed the public policy of illegality 
in the light of the United Kingdom’s treaty obligations to protect the victims of trafficking, see Hounga v Allen and 
another [2014] UKSC 47. 
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Consideration of the second raises the matter of the relationship between the s. 3 interpretive 
obligation that ‘so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must 
be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’; and the 
provision in s. 4 for a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ where legislation cannot be so interpreted. 
The wider the scope of the s. 3 obligation, the greater the potential transfer of ‘legislative’ power 
to the judiciary as courts strain the ordinary linguistic meaning of the statutory words to ensure 
compatibility. By contrast, the s. 4 declaration provides a mechanism whereby the position of 
elected representatives, be it Parliament or the executive, is restored to primacy in the resolution 
of human rights problems. In Boots, consideration of this constitutional distinction between s. 3 
and s. 4 was sidestepped because of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that there had been no human 
rights violation. Since we reject that view, it is incumbent upon us to indicate how the Court of 
Appeal should have addressed this matter. 
 
Beginning with the domestic court’s approach to ECtHR decisions, in the case of Ullah, Lord 
Bingham famously stated that the judicial responsibility in the domestic sphere was ‘to keep pace 
with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less.’38 This 
has come to be known as the ‘mirror principle’. The metaphor of mirroring is in fact rather 
misleading, and subsequent cases (even those sympathetic to the general tenor of Ullah) soon 
qualified this principle somewhat. In Pinnock, for example, Lord Neuberger observed that, ‘Where 
there is a clear and constant line of decisions whose effect is not inconsistent with some 
fundamental substantive or procedural aspect of our law, and whose reasoning does not appear to 
overlook or misunderstand some argument or point of principle, we consider that it would be 
wrong for this court not to follow that line.’39 The ‘mirror’ in Pinnock, such as it survives, is 
hedged with qualifications and this opens up ample room for judicial manoeuvre. For example, the 
absence of a ‘clear and constant line of decisions’ in the ECtHR necessarily expands the 
interpretive latitude for the domestic court. Inconsistency with a ‘fundamental substantive or 
procedural aspect’ of the domestic legal framework would also lead the domestic court to go its 
own way and maintain fidelity to indigenous legal values. 
                                                          
38 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 A.C. 323 HL at [20]. 
39 Pinnock v Manchester City Council [2011] 2 AC 104, para 48. 
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The normative basis of the ‘mirror principle’ is strongly contested, though it does have staunch 
judicial defenders.40 For example, Sales L.J. (who concurred with Underhill L.J.s judgment in 
Boots) has applauded the principle as an interpretive doctrine for national courts in his extra-
judicial writings. According to Sales L.J., this doctrine reflects the genesis of the HRA as giving 
domestic effect to Convention rights in order to make provision for domestic enforcement and 
domestic remedies. In so doing, it avoids the need for a lengthy and expensive trip to Strasbourg 
for claimants.41 Furthermore, alignment between domestic and European case law supports Rule 
of Law values by promoting a consistent and determinate approach to human rights standards.42 
By contrast, a bifurcated jurisprudence, with national courts departing from the standards set by 
the ECtHR, might be productive of confusion and uncertainty. In our view, these arguments 
support the proposition that European human rights law sets a ‘floor’ for domestic courts. They do 
not support the position that the jurisprudence of the ECtHR constitutes a ‘ceiling’ for national 
human rights protections. We would regard this ‘ceiling’ approach as especially problematic in the 
Boots litigation for the following four reasons.   
 
First, there is not yet, in the words of Lord Neuberger in Pinnock, a ‘clear and constant line of 
decisions’ for national courts to ‘mirror’ in respect of the specific regulatory problem in Boots. In 
contrast to the right to strike, there is very little detailed jurisprudence on the fundamental right to 
collective bargaining in the ECtHR. Nor is there European case law addressing the specific points 
raised in Boots. In these circumstances, it is incumbent on national courts to develop the domestic 
jurisprudence by appeal to the general principles underpinning freedom of association under 
Article 11.43 As Lord Reed has observed in another context, it would be inappropriate for domestic 
courts ‘to adopt an attitude of agnosticism and refrain from recognising such a right simply because 
                                                          
40 Richard Clayton, ‘Smoke and mirrors: the Human Rights Act and the impact of Strasbourg case law’ (2012) 
Public Law 639. 
41 Sir Philip Sales, ‘Strasbourg Jurisprudence and the Human Rights Act: A Response to Lord Irvine’ (2012) Public 
Law 253, 258-259. 
42 Ibid. 260-261. 
43 For discussion of the role of principles in human rights reasoning, see Eirik Bjorge, ‘The Courts and the ECHR: A 
Principled Approach to the Strasbourg Jurisprudence’ (2013) 72 Cambridge Law Journal 289. 
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Strasbourg has not spoken.’44 We have already seen that the Canadian case law provided more 
determinate guidance on what might be entailed by those general principles under Article 11, and 
those general principles favoured the PDAU’s arguments. 
 
The second reason lies in the rather problematic nature of the Unite decision itself, upon which the 
Court of Appeal relied heavily in Boots. Unite is a short and thinly reasoned decision on 
admissibility, and the circumstances of the decision are clearly distinct from those in Boots. For 
example, the wide margin of appreciation in Unite was partly attributable to the process of 
democratic scrutiny that had preceded the abolition of the Agricultural Wages Board.45 In Boots, 
by contrast, the relevant legislation had been implemented some years prior to the recognition of 
the fundamental right to collective bargaining in Demir. Again, the ECtHR in Unite was evidently 
moved by the fact that ‘the applicant is not prevented from engaging in collective bargaining.’46 
In Boots, by contrast, the PDAU had been prevented, or at the very least greatly impeded, from 
engaging in collective bargaining by the existence of the bar to its statutory application under 
Schedule A1. The remoteness of Unite from the factual dispute in Boots meant that its legal 
relevance to the Article 11 analysis is heavily attenuated. 
 
The third reason is the failure of the Court of Appeal to grasp the normative significance of 
‘subsidiarity’ in the domain of fundamental rights jurisprudence. A comparative perspective on 
the European ‘right to collective bargaining’ indicates that there is not one European right, there 
are many. Different collective bargaining systems display a kaleidoscopic variety: the legal 
enforceability of collective agreements between the parties; the incorporation of norms into 
individual contracts of employment; the variety of legal methods for extending the normative 
effects of collective agreements erga omnes; the juridical status of peace obligations and the 
permissible role of members-only bargaining. As we have already noted, the Hohfeldian 
interpretation of Article 11’s right to collective bargaining as logically correlative to a duty to 
                                                          
44 Ambrose [2011] UKSC 43 at [128]. See further Lord Reed, ‘The Relationship between the Strasbourg Court and 
the National Courts – As Seen from the UK Courts’, in Katja S Ziegler, Elizabeth Wicks, and Loveday Hodson (eds), 
The UK and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship? (Hart, 2015) ch 3. 
45 Para 64. For the role of democratic deliberation in the ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine under the ECHR, see 
Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom [2013] ECHR 362. 
46 Para 65 
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bargain is untenable in a European context. In these circumstances, it might be better to think of 
interpretive authority as devolved by the ECtHR to the national courts, and hence a responsibility 
shared, rather than allocated exclusively to one or the other.47 This allows the national court to 
develop highly abstract rights, such as the right to collective bargaining, in ways that are sensitive 
to national traditions. The ‘mirror’ metaphor is ill-suited to circumstances of regulatory diversity, 
which are common in the field of labour rights and acute in respect of collective bargaining 
systems. 
 
Finally, the Court of Appeal in Boots was evidently influenced by the fact that ‘both before and 
after Demir the Court has emphasised the wide margin of appreciation which must be accorded to 
member states in this area.’48 We regard this emphasis on the Strasbourg margin of appreciation 
as misplaced in a domestic context. Despite some suggestions to the contrary,49 the margin of 
appreciation doctrine is specifically concerned with the appropriate normative limits of 
international adjudication vis-à-vis national legal orders.50 According to Lord Hoffmann in Re G, 
  
‘it must be remembered that the Strasbourg court is an international court, deciding whether 
a Member State, as a state, has complied with its duty in international law to secure to 
everyone within its jurisdiction the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. 
Like all international tribunals, it is not concerned with the separation of powers within the 
Member State. When it says that a question is within the margin of appreciation of a 
Member State, it is not saying that the decision must be made by the legislature, the 
executive or the judiciary. That is a matter for the Member State.’51 
 
                                                          
47 For a nice discussion in these terms, see Dean Spielmann, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation?’ (2014) 67 
Current Legal Problems 49, 63. 
48 Para 68 
49 Sir Philip Sales and Richard Ekins, ‘Rights-Consistent Interpretation and the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2011) 127 
LQR 217, describing ‘deference’ as the ‘domestic analogue’ of margin of appreciation. 
50 David Pannick, ‘Principles of Interpretation of Community Rights under the Human Rights Act and the 
Discretionary Area of Judgment’ [1998] Public Law 545, 548-549; Paul Craig, Administrative Law (Sweet and 
Maxwell, 7th ed 2012) 618. 
51 Re G [2008] UKHL 38, para 32.  
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We believe that the judicial anxieties underlying the ‘mirror principle’ more often relate to the 
appropriate constitutional limits of human rights adjudication by national courts. The concerns 
about the integrity of the ECHR as a uniform body of norms are usually a red herring. Given the 
fundamental issues of constitutional principle at stake, it would be better to address those concerns 
directly, rather than mediating them through the margin of appreciation doctrine. In truth, the 
margin of appreciation doctrine is an unhelpful distraction when the national court is considering 
how it should proceed in a domestic human rights challenge to legislation in a parliamentary 
democracy. We recognise that the constitutional considerations are rather finely balanced. There 
is a long and inglorious history of judicial activism in the field of social legislation, with the 
common law used to disrupt and impede social democratic agendas pursued through public 
power.52 From out of this history emerged a politically progressive case for judicial abstention in 
the field of labour relations. Generally speaking, there are sound reasons of democratic principle 
and institutional expertise for judicial deference to legislatures in adjusting the complex political 
trade-offs in collective labour relations. This was no doubt reflected in the primary significance of 
statute as a ‘source’ of labour law from the middle decades of the twentieth century onwards.53 It 
is nonetheless the case that courts are increasingly important as a defensive backstop to vindicate 
basic rights against legislative and executive encroachment, particularly in the era of economic 
austerity. 
 
This brings us, finally, to the appropriate choice between interpretation and declaration of 
incompatibility under the HRA. The interpretative obligation under s. 3 of the HRA could be 
engaged in two ways in Boots. The first was reflected in the reasoning and approach of the CAC 
Panel. Applying the interpretive test in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,54 the CAC read the words ‘in 
respect of pay, hours and holidays’ into paragraph 35(1), the effect of which was to exclude the 
limited form of recognition arrangement between Boots and the BPA as a bar to the admissibility 
of the PDAU’s statutory application under Schedule A1. In the first High Court hearing, Keith J. 
rejected this interpretive move. This was because the words inserted into paragraph 35 (1) were in 
                                                          
52 Lord Wedderburn, ‘Laski’s Law Behind the Law. 1906 to European Labour Law’ in Richard Rawlings (ed), Law, 
Society and Economy: Centenary Essays for the London School of Economics and Political Science 1985–1995 (OUP 
1997) 
53 Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy: A Contemporary History (OUP 1993). 
54 [2004] 2 AC 557, HL. 
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fact specifically excluded by the express words of paragraph 3(6). The second possible route was 
the interpretation of ‘collective bargaining’ under Part VI of the Schedule, dealing with 
derecognition of a non-independent trade union. It may be recalled that the wide meaning of 
‘collective bargaining’ in section 178 TULRCA is expressly dis-applied by the legislation in the 
definition of the gateway into Part VI. The Court of Appeal concluded that the meaning of 
‘collective bargaining’ under paragraphs 35 (1) and Part VI ought to be uniform; otherwise, if the 
meaning in Part VI were narrower, it would have the effect of entrenching a recognition 
arrangement with a non-independent trade union while disabling workers from pursuing 
derecognition. The Court of Appeal would have been prepared to invoke the special interpretive 
principles under s. 3 HRA 1998, but did not think it was necessary to do so. 
 
It should be clear that we regard the second interpretive route as flawed, because we do not regard 
the existing derecognition machinery as compliant with Article 11. The first interpretive route 
adopted by the CAC is more promising, albeit that it was given short shrift by the High Court. Its 
effect is to facilitate an admissible application by an independent trade union, obviating the need 
for a separate derecognition process, in circumstances where the voluntary recognition 
arrangement does not cover the ‘core’ issues of ‘pay, hours and holidays’. Despite its attractions, 
however, we think that the interpretive issues are too complex to be amenable to judicial resolution 
in this way. The interpretation proposed by the CAC was a direct contradiction of the express 
words in the statute, which specifically applied the broader definition in s. 178. We would not 
regard this objection as insuperable. However, there are larger concerns here with the relative 
institutional competence of the courts and the legislature in the determination of complex policy 
choices in the ‘political’ domain of labour relations. It seems to us that there are a range of possible 
Convention-compliant interpretations of paragraph 35 (1). One such interpretation was adopted by 
the CAC in Boots, and it was one that was closely tailored to the factual circumstances of that 
dispute. It is not difficult to imagine that there might be other contexts where this s. 3 interpretation 
was unfit for purpose. Imagine, for example, a variation on the facts of NUJ. A non-representative 
and non-independent trade union, perhaps with ‘at most’ one member in the bargaining unit, enters 
into a voluntary recognition arrangement with an employer that covers ‘pay, hours, and holidays’. 
The CAC’s interpretation would be of no help in this situation.  
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We could introduce a more elaborate set of provisions into the statutory framework through s. 3 
interpretation, such as a requirement that any voluntary arrangement be ‘representative’ or 
‘approved by a majority of workers’. We might then need to add further words to elaborate how 
such representativity might be tested by the CAC. By now, the Court would surely be straying 
across the boundary from interpreting into legislating. In these circumstances, the court is going 
beyond its constitutional remit.55 The sensitive judgements of social and economic policy required 
in the field of labour relations means that there ought to be an extra ‘tilt’ in favour of a s. 4 
declaration in situations where regulators are faced with politically controversial ‘polycentric’ 
issues of this kind. In other words, we agree that judges should not be engaged in the business of 
drafting detailed labour statutes, and courts should be cautious of the legislative cascade that might 
ensue under the interpretative obligation.  
 
None of this provides an excuse for judicial reticence in the face of human rights violations. Rather, 
it supports the PDAU’s pursuit of a ‘declaration of incompatibility’, to give the government an 
opportunity to reconsider the legislative scheme in the light of evolving human rights standards 
under Article 11. This would also have enabled the government to address the wider problems in 
this area, in particular the position of non-representative arrangements with independent trade 
unions in NUJ-type situations. It is ironic that a Court of Appeal motivated by a concern to respect 
the democratic role of Parliament closed off what will probably be the PDAU’s only effective 
opportunity to access the democratic process to prompt a second look at this deficient legislation, 
by way of a s. 4 declaration. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
A quick reading of Boots might generate the misleading impression that this is simply another 
technical dispute arising out of a rather marginal piece of legislation; of interest, perhaps, to a 
dwindling band of zealots pursuing esoteric studies into ‘collective labour law’, but of no wider 
                                                          
55 See Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467, HL. 
26 
 
importance than that. It is our contention that this would be a misreading of the decision. Beneath 
the surface of statutory technicalities lies a set of issues of fundamental constitutional significance.  
 
As we have seen, the Court of Appeal was acutely sensitive, in Boots, to democratic concerns 
regarding its role in scrutinising legislation against the yardstick of human rights standards. Such 
concerns are not, of course, necessarily misplaced. The ‘right to collective bargaining’ is 
indisputably a fundamental human right in the international legal order, recognised as such in a 
wide variety of binding international instruments. In Claire Kilpatrick’s terms, the right is 
testament to the polycentricity of fundamental labour rights.56 This polycentricity creates complex 
interpretive challenges at the domestic level, and it necessitates the making of controversial 
normative choices as to how to concretise heterogeneous (and sometimes conflicting) norms into 
a workable set of legal rules and principles at the level of the nation state. In the event of repeal of 
the Human Rights Act 1998, the politicisation of legal decision-making in this country may 
become even more acute as domestic courts navigate their way through a multivalent legal 
universe. From this perspective, the crucial constitutional question is not whether labour rights are 
human rights, but who should determine their content in circumstances of reasonable 
disagreement. In this respect, the Court of Appeal well understood the constitutional character of 
the decision before it. 
 
Having asked the right constitutional question, however, we believe that the Court of Appeal then 
provided the wrong answer. Difficulties arose, in part, because of the Court’s choice to frame its 
decision around the highly abstract ‘right to collective bargaining’, as opposed to the narrower and 
more precise ‘right that the trade union should be heard’. Had the case been reasoned with 
reference to the latter, the scope for normative controversy would have been narrowed and the 
Court’s own constitutional legitimacy bolstered. There would have been no need for the distracting 
detour into the work of Wesley Hohfeld, which did little to advance the Court’s understanding of 
the rights afforded by Article 11. In focussing instead upon the more abstract ‘right to collective 
bargaining’, however, the Court gave itself a much more difficult task. Notwithstanding the 
decision in Demir, it may be doubted to what extent the right to collective bargaining provides a 
                                                          
56 Claire Kilpatrick, ‘Has Polycentric Strike Law Arrived in the UK?’ (2014) 30 International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 293. 
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satisfactory yardstick for judicial scrutiny of detailed labour relations statutes. In general terms, 
the content in any particular jurisdiction of the constitutional right to collective bargaining tends, 
in practice, to be ‘filled in’ by the detailed specification provided by the legislature. Constitutional 
challenges then tend to focus on exclusions from the existing legislative scheme, rather than the 
substance of the statutory rights themselves.57 It is this mischief that Brian Langille has in mind 
when he talks of judges ‘constitutionalizing’ labour relations statutes or ‘drafting labour codes’.58 
We acknowledge that this risk is a real one, but contend nonetheless that the identification of 
general constitutional principles, such as in Mounted Police Association of Ontario, may provide 
mediate norms that enable the courts to respect democratic legitimacy whilst opening up some 
critical space between constitutional standards and domestic legislation. 
 
We contend, finally, that abstract constitutional concepts such as ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ or 
‘parliamentary democracy’ should be examined critically by the courts with a view to ascertaining 
what these doctrinal pieties mean in real terms for trade unions and working people. What matters 
is the constitution as it is, not as it might have appeared in Dicey.59 Readers of this Journal will 
be aware that the Trade Union Act 2016 imposed new constraints on the abilities of trade unions 
to maintain political funds, adding to an existing body of restrictive norms that operate to stifle the 
political advocacy activities of charities and other civil society groups. 60  These may have 
significant limiting effects on the opportunities for working people to participate in the legislative 
process, through their trade unions and the Labour Party. If that proves to be the case, litigation 
like that in Boots may provide the only viable avenue for democratic participation left for trade 
                                                          
57 This phenomenon seems to be occurring in the constitutional litigation in Canada. On the exclusion of 
agricultural workers from the general framework of labour relations, see Fraser v Ontario (Attorney General) 
[2011] 2 SCR 3. On the exclusion of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, see Mounted Police Association of Ontario 
v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 1. This has prompted Brian Langille to argue in favour of equality as the 
appropriate constitutional standard for challenging such exclusions: see Brian Langille, ‘The Freedom of 
Association Mess: How We Got Into It and How We Can Get Out of It’ (2009) 54 McGill LJ 177, 210-212. 
58 See, e.g., Langille (n 57). 
59 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1. 
60 Alan Bogg, ‘Beyond Neo-Liberalism: The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Authoritarian State’ (2016) 45 ILJ 299, 
307-312. 
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unions and workers. In such circumstances, the democratic arguments against judicial review are, 
we believe, greatly attenuated.61  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61 This is recognised by progressive sceptics of judicial review, like Jeremy Waldron, who concede that democratic 
arguments against judicial review depend upon the assumption that democratic institutions are well-functioning: 
see Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1347. 
